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The Political Economy of
Orbit Spectrum Leasing
Harvey Levin*
INTRODUCTION
This article I will propose several plans for allocating a common resource
of the earth-the international orbit spectrum--among nations through
mechanisms designed to introduce market incentives. The rights to orbital
"parking places" are so defined as to permit their subdivision, recombina-
tion, and assignment in lease markets. 2 The lease market approach accom-
modates the interests of both developed countries (DCs), who have the
technology and domestic demand to establish satellite systems today, and
less-developed countries (LDCs), who seek long-range planning to guar-
antee them access to the orbit spectrum at a time in the future when they,
too, possess the capability and need. 3 In the interim, this plan will provide
LDCs with income as the lessors of orbital slots they cannot currently use.
To elaborate, those states (primarily LDCs) who choose not to use their
orbit spectrum assignments can lease their rights to the highest bidder for
a term of years. Conversely, states with many operational satellite systems
(primarily DCs, with some East bloc participants) can lease any "extra"
orbit spectrum rights they need, if their allotment is insufficient. As lessee,
this state would pay an orbit spectrum rent, based, for example, on a
percentage of the gross revenues generated by the satellite system placed
in the leased orbital slot.
At present, the most significant hurdle to this plan is the current practice
of defining rights to a portion of the orbital spectrum in such a way that
they are usable by only a few states. For example, a satellite which trans-
mits and receives signals between New York and Los Angeles must be
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visible from both cities. If RCA (a large, private satellite system operator)
wishes to increase its transmission capacity between them, an unused
orbital slot over the Indian Ocean (assigned, say, to India) will do it no
good. Generally, a lease market operates more effectively when the leased
good is homogeneous. If homogeneous, the challenge, then, is to define
orbital spectrum rights in such a way that they are more readily transfera-
ble among potential uses and users.
The article first describes certain physical qualities of the orbit spec-
trum. As a scarce common resource, much like fisheries, the orbit spectrum
is subject to overuse, congestion and pollution. By introducing market
incentives, these undesirable external diseconomies will be optimized, or
at least mitigated. Next, the objectives of orbit spectrum allocation are
introduced to provide a yardstick from which to appraise the two compet-
ing approaches which have been proposed by DCs and LDCs, viz., first
come, first served, and a priori planning. After proposing to generalize orbit
spectrum rights so as to render them more exchangeable and hence im-
prove the operation of lease markets, the article then evaluates certain
imperfections caused by economic and technical constraints.
Recognizing that free markets are difficult to achieve, the article dis-
cusses certain modified market mechanisms which, while falling short of
the efficiency inherent in lease markets, still offer advantages over the
present nonmarket system. These mechanisms are analyzed from a one-
country perspective.
International lease markets are analyzed in the remainder of the article.
A basic rent system is proposed. To accommodate LDC concerns over
future access, two arrangements are discussed which provide lessors with
greater protection: a guaranteed accommodation procedure and a modified
coordination procedure.
PHYSICAL QUALITIES OF THE ORBIT SPECTRUM
Scarcity
The orbit spectrum is a scarce resource for three reasons. First, any object
placed in an orbit 22,300 miles above the surface of the earth rotates at the
same speed as the earth and thus appears stationary when viewed from
earth. Commonly referred to as the geostationary or geosychronous orbit,
this is a preferred position in which to place satellites. Since satellites
placed in that orbit do not move in relation to the transmitting or receiving
points on earth, expensive tracking gear is not needed; it is much less costly
to "bounce" signals off them than off a "moving" satellite. To occupy a
position in this orbit, however, a satellite must be placed within a narrow
REGULATION OF GEOSTATIONARY ORBIT 43
corridor above the equator. The physical space to provide least cost orbits
is thus limited.
Second, once a satellite is placed in orbit, its signals travel in straight
lines. Earth stations must be in a direct line of sight to the satellite to
receive or transmit the signals. Owing to the curvature of the earth, some
orbits over oceans or sparsely populated areas which are out of the line of
sight of current land users cannot be utilized. So as a practical matter, some
orbit slots are not exploitable.
Finally, each satellite is limited in the range of radio frequencies it can
carry. Given adequate separation between frequencies to avoid interfer-
ence, each frequency can carry a different message. But if satellites are
placed too close together, and they are transmitting to the same region of
the earth, their signals will interfere with each other. 4 Thus, the limited
amount of exploitable orbit space cannot be too congested.
A Common Resource
From an economic perspective, the orbit spectrum is a finite, common
resource, similar to the air, a river, watershed, migratory fishery or an oil
pool because, like them, the orbit spectrum is subject to pollution, conges-
tion, and overuse. 5 Few common resources are owned by individual firms
or countries; even when they are nominally owned by some entity, exclu-
sive property rights are rarely enforced. 6 Thus, either all potential users
own the resource (a "common heritage of mankind") or no one owns it;
the consequences are the same. If the common resource is not owned, no
one extracts a royalty for its use or regulated exploration, or prevents
unauthorized use. Only through actual occupancy, use or harvesting can
any rights be established. Unfortunately, rational users will tend to over-
pump, overfish or-in the case of orbit spectrum--overoccupy (by taking
up more slots, more quickly, than is economically efficient).
By way of illustration, the first person to arrive at a rich fishing bank
in international waters takes what he can, and is wise to do it as quickly
and thoroughly as possible, before other potential users can discover the
bank or begin fishing it too. But similarly, consider three contiguous plots
of land owned by different persons over a sizable pool of oil. Generally
speaking, without external intervention (e.g., output quotas), no mech-
anism exists to divide up the pool among the three plots. Therefore if
Driller A has purchased a lease on plot 1, it is in his interest to lift as much
oil out of the ground as rapidly as possible, before other drillers arrive on
the other parcels. Certainly the oil may have flowed partly from under-
neath plots 2 and 3, but since a pool cannot be divided, the owner of the
other plots can do little to stop Driller A if he enjoys a lead in time (over
his rivals). Even if the price of oil is low, Driller A has an incentive to pump
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and sell immediately since waiting for higher prices might mean that
drillers B and C on the other plots will exploit the resource first. In the case
of renewable resources such as fisheries, finally, the fact that no one owns
the resource implies that no user has an incentive to moderate his fishing
to allow regeneration. In the absence of outside institutional safeguards,
excessive, premature investment and output often result. 7
Additionally, latecomers are often reduced to exploiting economically
less attractive regions, grades or qualities of the resource, at higher invest-
ment and operating costs. Finally, as users rush to be first, in order to
establish position and pre-empt other users, exploitation costs rise for all
the users. Nevertheless, technical innovation seems likely to help bring
down per unit costs of satellite technology for all countries. Therefore, the
developing countries may also enjoy certain compensatory free-rider ben-
efits, although it is hard to determine if these exceed the higher cost of
latecomer access.
OBJECTIVES OF ORBIT SPECTRUM ALLOCATION PLANS
There are five basic objectives which an orbit spectrum allocation plan
should ideally achieve. The plan should lead to widespread availability of
service--among regions and among uses. 8 The plan should directly reward
technological advancement. The orbital spectrum should be available
equitably to all nations. Finally, the plan should above all promote eco-
nomic as well as technical efficiency. 9
It is immediately clear that these goals may often conflict. For example,
to guarantee equitable access by partitioning the orbital spectrum and
assigning pieces to states far into the future might mean that many seg-
ments assigned to LDCs would remain unused for long periods, even if it
were economical for other nations or private entities to use them. Some-
times a plan yielding the highest physical or technical level of signal
transmission (and hence "availability") may be uneconomic.
METHODS OF ORBIT SPECTRUM ALLOCATION
First-come, First-served
Two basic models of allocation address these objectives in different ways.
A first-come, first-served system gives priority to the first user who places
a satellite in orbit over latecomers. In the case of satellites put up by an
individual firm with limited resources, this approach might appear to be
economically efficient because, presumably, a market study will justify the
initial capital outlay.
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Yet in the above mentioned common pool context, economic efficiency
might be impaired because each satellite company may, in principle, tend
to build more systems sooner than economically optimal, for fear that rival
companies would otherwise launch their own in the face of dwindling
orbit spectrum resources. While this might provide a high level of physical
service, it would not in general yield maximum economic efficiency.
Nor are many LDCs currently able to raise the needed capital, and thus,
the opportunity to use a satellite is not widely available. 10 Moreover, the
best technical use of the orbit spectrum in practice means that only the
most advanced technology is used, which is not necessarily the most eco-
nomic use. The first-come, first-served approach may thus achieve techni-
cal efficiency but only at the cost of neglecting other objectives. 11
A Piori Planning
On the other extreme, there is a priori planning. 12 Under such a regime,
orbital slots are allocated to all states for a period extending far into the
future, and the goal of equitable access is maximized. 13 However, a priori
allocation may result in many spaces assigned to LDCs going unused for
long periods while those slots given to DCs are overused and potential
projects needing additional slots languish.
Thus, the challenge is to create an allocation system that maximizes all
five goals-widespread service availability, encouragement of technical
progress, equitable access, and economic as well as technical efficiency-
while retaining flexibility to change as plans and objectives or participants
change. A lease market may be such a system to help provide "a practical
compromise . . . between the evolutionary approach [first-come, first-
served] and a rigid a priori plan for use of the geostationary orbit." 
14
LEASE MARKETS: BASIC PRECONDITIONS 15
Distinct Markets for Orbital Slots and Satellite Services
A pure market allocation system allows any holder of orbital spectrum
rights the untrammeled freedom to acquire, sell or lease any quantity or
type of rights it chooses. From virtually any initial allocation of the re-
source 16 to the participants, each actor could undertake any transaction it
wished, provided it had the required legal rights to do so. In the case of
the orbit spectrum, the trading could be in either the undivided rights to
a "parking place" in space, or to a portion of the transmitting and receiving
capacity of a satellite for specified time periods.
The orbit slots or "parking places" themselves, are intermediate factors
which are marketable among only a limited number of participants be-
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cause only a few economic or political organizations would find it within
their means and worth their while to finance the occupancy of a slot. The
telecommunications services made available as a consequence of orbit slot
occupancy are much more marketable since more people are in a position
to demand, purchase, and use them. 17 Thus, the more active market would
be not for slots but for the twenty-four transponders available on each
satellite.
An illustrative analogy is provided by the market for urban real estate.
Plots of land in a large city are finite and, to be useful, require significant
capital improvements (e.g., to erect an office tower). This is one market.
Another, more active market exists for the space in those office towers. The
market for individual offices is preferred by those users who are unable to
finance an entire building. The office market builds upon the land and
building markets: the number of direct players in the latter markets is small
when compared to the secondary market for office space.
Just as a real estate developer may lease or purchase a plot of land, erect
a building, and then dispose of the space therein; 18 so, too, states and large
firms may bid for orbital slots, launch geostationary satellites, and then
dispose of the transponders. Orbit slots and transponder sub-units can
both be traded in competitive markets, just as office buildings as well as
office space are traded.
Societal Rules
Certain societal rules must exist for these markets to function, however.
In our urban real estate example they are found in domestic laws of
property and contract. Generally, rules are necessary first to limit permit-
ted uses of the resource so as to avoid impinging on a neighboring resource
holder's ability to exercise its preferred uses for the property. 19 Second, to
protect the value of one's investment from outsiders, one must be able to
bar admission to one's property and to eject unauthorized trespassers.
Third, the user needs some freedom to bring together those inputs which
are necessary to accomplish its objective, consistent with any neighbor's
rights. Fourth, so as to recoup its initial investment (and thus encourage
others), the users should be free to sell or sublease a portion of the resource.
In the case of the orbit spectrum, the basic rules consist of: (1) emission
rights to transmit signals, using designated frequency bandwidth, time,
three-dimensional space, and maximum permissible power; (2) rights to
exclude harmful interference; (3) freedom to combine or subdivide various
rights; and (4) freedom to transfer such rights on terms mutually agreeable
to the parties.
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MODIFYING THE IDEAL: ACCOMMODATING
ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL IMPERFECTIONS
The "ideal" economist's model must be modified to accommodate major
economic and technical imperfections which impede the creation of ideal
-spectrum markets. The imperfections partly stem from the manner in
which electronic signals interact physically. These interactions are so var-
ied that the task of defining who may transmit what signal at what fre-
quency to which place on earth requires enormously detailed specifications
of inputs before rights can become easily transferable. 20
Even with this initial hurdle, lease markets still can operate. Consider
an analogy to the real estate market of a large city. The amount of available
ground space is limited, just as the number of spaces in the geostationary
orbit. If space is too expensive in the city, a potential real estate investor
can buy land in the outlying suburbs, just as a potential user of satellite
communications can opt for terrestrial systems.
In an active real estate market, land will move toward its most highly
valued use (e.g., tearing down a brownstone to erect an office tower); by
analogy, imagine an underutilized orbit slot being leased to a more active
user who is willing to pay a higher price than it is worth to the present user.
Market participants cope with the problem of interference (e.g., in real
estate: overcrowding, obstruction of view) by regulations (zoning) and
through market adaptation (e.g., moving one's offices from a crowded inner
city section to outlying areas). They are also encouraged to invest in tech-
nological advancement (e.g., designing satellites to handle more signals).
In short, free market trading will ideally yield an optimal level of inter-
ference and congestion: A sensitive user will acquire a slot with less inter-
ference and transfer his slot to a user who is more tolerant of interference.
Such trading will also distribute the spectrum to its highest valued uses.
The value of a piece of the spectrum to any user will eventually equal the
value in any best alternative use, and the net economic value of authorized
levels of signal output is maximized. 21
The functioning of an efficient market may also be hindered by "hold
outs": Right holders in adjacent slots, of the spectrum are in a position to
hold out against each other and so prevent otherwise economical combina-
tions of rights. The right to use contiguous pieces of the resource is needed.
In our real estate analogy, to make building a large office tower feasible,
three small adjacent plots might be needed. Similarly, to accommodate a
new TV station in the UHF band might in principle require spectrum
which could otherwise have accommodated hundreds of mobile radio
transmitters. The "hold out" attempts to obtain more than the normal
market price for the orbital slot (i.e., the price paid by buyers who do not
need that particular parcel). An arbitral tribunal run by the ITLJ could,
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however, resolve this problem by setting a fair value for the hold out's
share of the orbit spectrum.
A final limit on the free operation of markets is posed by transfer costs,
including the enormous capital commitment, of moving from one use of
rights to another. For example, an orbit spectrum user must terminate the
old satellite, launch a new one and upgrade all its ground equipment.
Transfer costs can hinder shifts from lower to higher valued uses. The
burden of committing a large amount of capital can thus lead to operating
inefficiencies.
In spite of these difficulties, real estate markets in cities the world over
are vigorous; methods are devised to resolve the tension between political
policies and economic demand. Lease markets for orbital spectrum spaces
should similarly be able to juggle political objectives (equitable access,
technological sophistication, wide dispersion of signals) and economic
forces (demand for new slots by LDCs) so as to improve the efficiency of
the outcome.
DOMESTIC UNITED STATES ALTERNATIVES
TO FREELY TRANSFERABLE RIGHTS
The efficient allocation of satellite transmission rights in domestic service
can be achieved by market-type mechanisms. 22 In broadcasting services, 2
3
a set of federally-designed rights, pre-planned to forestall third party
signal interference, can be auctioned off to the highest qualified govern-
ment or private company bidder, much like continental-shelf oil leases are
sold. Such auctions compare favorably with the current cumbersome, ex-
pensive administrative practice of evaluating the applications of almost
indistinguishable candidates. Bidder qualifications could be carefully spe-
cified and screened to safeguard against bidder collusion. The goal here is
to reconcile market and administrative criteria in the allocation and licens-
ing of the orbit spectrum.
Another domestic modified market-type mechanism would permit
rightholders occasionally to trade rights without the prior permission of
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), provided they are within
designated parameters. For example, rights assigned to many classes of
safety and special radio services could be freely transferred (by organs
competent to trade for whole groups of users) from the now over-detailed
spectrum allocation to some thirty odd services: remaining regulations
would then merely require that technical signal standards common to all
private radio services be met.
A third mechanism would entail the derivation of so-called "shadow
prices" 24 of spectrum bandwidth between two competing, heterogeneous
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services. For example, estimating the marginal value of a little more or a
little less spectrum to the TV service as compared with the land mobile
service could help allocate the spectrum between these two uses. Of
course, regulatory and administrative considerations could still override an
economic decision based on the shadow price. But administrative regulato-
ry decision makers would no longer proceed in total disregard of such
economic measures. 25
A final modified market mechanism would involve user charges varying
with the degree of utilization of the several dimensions of the spectrum
resource, i.e., bandwidth, frequency, time, polarization, intensity, and
three-dimensional space. Although deriving such a user fee schedule might
be extremely difficult, spectrum charges could be set through trial and
error. User fees based, e.g., on differences arising from marginal changes in
available bandwidth, operate to enhance economic efficiency because they
may induce least-cost factor input mixes more reflective of the true social
opportunity costs of spectrum use than when spectrum is used at a zero
price.
These modified market-type mechanisms are a more palatable way-
politically-to inject economic incentives into spectrum allocation than a
completely free spectrum market would be. Some form of market mech-
anism is needed, however, because there are always substitutes for spec-
trum. Yet, without price signals there is no incentive to seek them or assess
their relative economic utility. Such modified market-type mechanisms are
not so inconsistent with the current legal-institutional framework as to
preclude their adoption. Their economic merits are, in fact, enough to make
them important potential steps to inject economic factors into decision
making about spectrum allocations. They also seem amenable to being
phased in gradually so as to mitigate the degree of opposition by officials
with real-world "line responsibilities." Finally, while it is by no means
self-evident that the use of auctions in domestic markets can be readily
extended to international uses of orbit spectrum, such an application has
from time to time been proposed.
LEASE MARKETS IN THE INTERNATIONAL SETTING
This article next explores how certain international schemes have the
potential-when combined with our observations in the general discussion
of the basic preconditions of lease markets-to (1) move orbit spectrum
rights from lower to higher valued uses among and within nations; (2)
reconcile Third World demands for equitable access to orbit spectrum
resources with developed countries' concerns for economic efficiency,
technological progress and continued access; and (3) reduce the relative
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transaction costs 2 6 of multilateral exchanges compared to those now in-
curred at international conferences where allocations are made without
prices.
Several possible approaches incorporate economic incentives for the
efficient use of the orbit spectrum: (1) a pure lease model; 27 (2) real-world
leasing arrangements for unused orbit spectrum assignments; (3) a guaran-
teed accommodation procedure where DCs using LDC slots post large
bonds to guarantee that DCs will vacate when LDC rightholders are ready
to enter; and (4) a modified coordination procedure with rules to help
equalize the standing of latecomers and incumbents in their use of spec-
trum and orbital arc.
This article will now sketch how the last three schemes might work. 28
But first, note that the key to each is largely the same: we must choose an
appropriate actor for the international setting and define spectrum rights
so they are more readily transferable.
Choosing an Appropriate Actor
When considering which actor is best suited to act in the international
setting, three factors are important. First, to manage and reduce the nega-
tive side effects of orbit and spectrum utilization without imposing costs
on neighbors (e.g., in the form of electronic noise) requires that participants
be large groupings of users; either regional consortia of governments, con-
sortia of users, governments or firms which are in widely scattered areas
around the world, or interfirm consortia within large states.
Second, to finance development of the necessary infrastructure requires
regional consortia and arrangements for joint collaboration between multi-
national corporations (MNCs) and LDCs. For example, the MNCs would
donate capital facilities in exchange for the exclusive right to sell earth
terminals and TV receivers. Alternatively, they could return a portion of
the revenues as a royalty to the host government, or they might simply use
their greater access to cheap capital to "donate" facilities, the cost of which
they would later recoup by raising their prices on compatible equipment
over as long a period as needed, assuming, of course, that they have enough
monopoly power to do this. These institutional arrangements to fund
telecommunication infrastructure development rely on entrepreneurial
acumen and initiative rather than outright government grants. 29
Third, the danger that political rivalries might impede the formation of
consortia of governments, or destroy existing consortia, could justify the
formation and management of a consortium by an outsider. For example,
a Western firm might line up several countries to participate in a leased
service.
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Leasing Arrangements for Unused Orbit Spectrum Assignments
A properly conceived leasing mechanism 30 might induce those LDCs cur-
rently unable to use their orbit spectrum assignments to rent them to
advanced countries for designated time periods. 31 By the same token, the
DCs could better secure the extra orbit spectrum rights needed to develop
new systems when their own slots and frequencies are fully occupied. DCs
would secure these rights by paying sums to LDC rightholders tantamount
to rent. 32
Lease markets could, in fact, be based on one of two assumptions. First,
orbital slots and radio frequencies are all distributed by the ITU and owned
outright by LDCs and DCs, thereafter with LDCs leasing their unused slots
to HDCs. Second, the IFRB records assignments, as today, for limited
renewable periods, with LDCs free, within those periods, to sublease, or
lend, unused assignments to DCs which want more than they currently
have.
The major obstacle to instituting any viable leasing system is the con-
tinued practice of overspecifying spectrum rights, i.e., of defining them in
such detail as to make them virtually unusable by any country except the
one to which they were assigned. 33 The power, orbit location, frequency
bandwidth, antenna beam, and directivity that each nation is authorized
to use are specified so narrowly that there are few alternative uses or users
for which they are suitable. To facilitate the prospects for leasing, there-
fore, we must define orbit spectrum rights so as to make them far more
transferable than is the case today. 34
To increase the transferability of these rights in an economically effi-
cient manner, a "loosely" packed orbit spectrum allocation plan is re-
quired. Rights must be vested not in unique points in any segment of the
orbital arc, 35 but in a whole range of such points within a designated
segment of the arc. By generalizing the rights, any initial assignment holder
could locate its satellite at any point within the orbital arc assigned to it.
If an assignment were to remain unused because its holder did not have
the need or resources to exploit it, a potential lessee would not have to use
a specific "parking place," which was originally designed to meet the needs
of the lessor were the lessor to use it. Instead the lessee could use any one
of several "parking places," depending upon which suited its needs. 36 The
possibility of trading to a third party would be significantly increased
because points located at different places in the assigned segment would
be suitable for a number of potential users, even though a particular point
might not be. 
37
Assigning rights in whole segments of orbital arc necessarily entails
loosely packed allocational plans in which vacancies more readily permit
a move from lower to higher valued uses. Full occupancy might, however,
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be impossible to attain. 38 In addition, even though frequencies or orbital
slots are currently defined chiefly to benefit original rightholders, subleas-
ing and recombination would create new arrangements useful to others.
Services and uses which are quite different from those currently envisioned
may result. 39 International spectrum brokers could conceivably facilitate
the packaging and repackaging of spectrum rights.
Another way to conceptualize the generalizing of orbit spectrum rights
is as follows. Assume that only one compatible set of satellite services can
be accommodated; let A,B,C, . . .,Z represent individual states. Suppose
that each slot can accommodate four satellites, each aimed at a different
country and service area. Assume further that more than one service confi-
guration is possible, so that service areas ABCD (each served by a separate
satellite) is one configuration; AEFG being an alternate configuration; and
AHIJ still another, each with no unacceptable interference. (Other configu-
rations may not, however, be compatible with all satellite uses of the slot
in question, so that satellites serving EFGH would interfere with one
another, as may those aimed at IJKL.) Assume, finally, that the orbit
spectrum needed to reach service areas BCD, while usable technically, is
not economically viable and is hence left unused, whereas the orbit spec-
trum needed to reach service areas EFG is deemed usable economically as
well as technically. It might then be worthwhile for countries EFG to buy
out orbit spectrum assignments from BCD, and use them at the same time
as A.
Furthermore; if country A held slot rights in generalized form, it could
sublease orbit spectrum to EFG, rather than to countries BCD for which
its rights are not economically useful. It would therefore be best for EFG
to form a joint venture and reach a collective agreement to sublease from
A, where A holds full generalized rights which could be aimed in any and
all directions (to AEFG, to AHIJ, etc.). The joint venture would then select
the configuration that is most economically attractive. 40
Were this not the case, and if A did not hold all slot rights, but only
its own (and if each of countries BCD owns only its own), then a far more
complex and costly transaction would be needed to bring about the above
result. EFG would have to coordinate their several strategies to buy out
BCD, since unless E, F, and G act collectively, they could not be sure that
each could operate in a compatible manner.
There are no over-simplified WARC 77-type assignments here (ABCD
alone). If we assume that only A (and not BCD) would be used, and that
EFG also stand ready to operate, then EFG are higher valued users than
BCD. Instead of specifying BCD as assignment holders, the ITU confer-
ence would place all assignment possibilities of the slot (i.e., generalized
rights) with country A, leaving A free to sublease to the combination of
highest bidders. Economic efficiency would be enhanced. 
4 1
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-Methods of Payment
The scheme would allow participants to experiment with the method of
payment for their use of the assignment. An occupant-lessee (say, the
United States) of the lessor's unused assignment could "pay" by providing
the latter (say, Mexico) with reduced rate domestic circuits. It could do so
at little incremental cost once its satellite is in place. Such payment in kind
might circumvent the ITU's resistance to spectrum pricing and at the same
time facilitate market-type exchanges of slots and spectrum.
Another option would be for LDCs simply to receive free stock in an
incorporated consortium, and share in the economic value generated by the
DC's satellite system that used the LDC's unused assignment. Or, the
LDCs could be granted stock ownership rights gratis in all satellites
launched into the geostationary orbit, as payment for the use of a global
resource which is "the common heritage of all mankind." This free stock
would constitute the kind of "payment in kind" illustrated by the United
States-Mexico example above. In all such schemes, we would attempt to
allocate satellite system stock shares rather than rights in the orbit spec-
trum resource itself.
Finally, the lessee could post bonds through a third-party insurer to
guarantee its pledge to vacate an LDC's unused assignment at some
agreed-upon time. The face value of such bonds would not be market-
determined by the expected value of the orbit spectrum assignment being
"borrowed." Rather, it would be set by the cost of the assignment's next
best terrestrial alternative. Nevertheless, failure to withdraw and the
consequent forfeiture of the bond should constitute a lump-sum payment
of rents equal to the minimum any orbit spectrum assignment holder would
require to release its assignment, 42 even though the assignment might be
worth much more than this to the DC-borrower.
One criticism LDCs have against any of these methods is that they
would be passive- recipients of rents or dividends. Many LDCs instead
want to be actively involved in developing their own communications
systems.
MECHANISMS TO SATISFY DEMANDS
FOR EQUITABLE ACCESS
Outlines of two mechanisms follow which would--consistent with a lease
proposal incorporating incentives for economic efficiency-meet Third
World demands for equitable access to the orbit spectrum. 43 First, a "guar-
anteed accommodation procedure" assumes that nations unable to use
orbit spectrum could be awarded rights which they could assign to groups
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with the capital and expertise necessary to exploit them. Second, a
"modified coordination procedure" presumes that both LDC latecomers
and DC incumbents are ready to exploit.
A Guaranteed Accommodation Procedure Through Sureties
A "guaranteed accommodation procedure" would be closest to the current
spectrum management system. The world's leading spectrum users would
essentially agree to make room in orbit spectrum for latecomers when their
technology and domestic needs had advanced to the point where they
wanted to establish their own satellite systems.
LDCs would have to agree to forego immediate claims on orbit spectrum
because their current technology does not permit effective usage. The
guaranteeing nations, in turn, would pledge to phase out or relocate satel-
lite operations upon LDC request within a predetermined time period,
provided the LDC demonstrated technical and economic competence for
utilization. Other rules would limit the useful life of satellite equipment
to a period not later than an agreed upon date when an LDC would be
ready and willing to enter. 44
Although this option is clearly preferred by DCs to a priori planning, the
question is whether credible safeguards for latecomer access can be devised
(e.g., stiff penalties for late withdrawal). The suspicion with which the
LDCs often view DC actions, exacerbated by LDC technical inability to
monitor compliance, would hinder the ability of DCs to convince LDCs to
forego use of their assignments for some period in favor of leasing them
to DCs.
One method to ensure that the DC vacates on schedule 45 would require
a DC or its concessionaire to post a bond which would be forfeited if the
DC does not vacate on time. In that case, the forfeited bond would be
tantamount to a lump-sum rental payment for occupancy of-the borrowed
assignment during the time period in which the LDC-lessor would other-
wise have entered. The posted bond would equal the cost of the LDC's
next best terrestrial alternative, less the cost of the new LDC satellite
service if the DC did vacate on time.
The promise of the LDC to stay out for a term of years is worth
enormous cost savings to the DC (i.e., what it would have had to pay had
the slot not been available). The DC's promise to vacate on schedule,
guaranteed by the bond, is also worth cost savings to the LDC. The two
promises become a contract between the LDC and DC. The LDC's own
orbit spectrum assignment effectively is "loaned" or "leased" to the DC
for a bond forfeited if the DC does not vacate on time. 46
The bond-posting method is at least similar to a lease from an LDC to
a DC company. The premium on the DC bond, reflective of the actuarial
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risk that the DC will not vacate on schedule, is bounded by the expected
difference between the cost of a given system in a particular orbit slot (for
DC or LDC), and the cost of the next best terrestrial alternative for the
LDC. This arrangement guarantees either that the LDC can enter when it
wants (the DC will vacate), or that the LDC will have funds for its next-
best alternative. The differences in the cost of the two options are the lease
value to the DC and to the LDC. 47 However, the premium on the bond,
paid to a surety company, is all the DC would have to pay.
It is important to distinguish bond and lease plans, however. In the bond
context no direct benefits would normally flow to LDCs, whereas in the
lease context they would (rent payments). Since the task is to establish a
subsidy system which is acceptable to LDCs and DCs, the plan must show
benefits to both sides. We must consider who pays how much, to whom,
for what, to secure the assignment. Common resources can reasonably be
expected to give the LDCs some rents; yet we do not want the "haves" to
pay exorbitant sums to the "have-nots."
Another basic issue here is how committed the LDCs are in their oppo-
sition to first-come, first-served, and how firm their opposition is to formal
leasing. If the LDCs prevail in imposing a priori plans, and in blocking
formal leasing, the bond-posting plan merits special consideration as a
possible "back door" alternative.
Who ultimately bears the risk that a DC will not vacate on time? Would
any DC ever vacate once it was operating? Would the premium on the
bond become bigger and bigger at each renewal? Since sureties do not
typically insure for more than three year periods, and the typical satellite
life is nine years, will the risk of DC default increase as each maturity date
approaches? How reliable and secure are long-term bonds anyway? Why
should the LDCs accept the proposed long-term bond, rather than insist
on annual lease charges? Presumably LDCs would prefer to be paid some-
thing each year during the ten or twenty-year period, and not wait until the
end with risks that the DC would renege. 48
A Modified Coordination Procedure With Economic Incentives
The next and final approach would create new mechanisms to strike a
better balance between latecomers and incumbents in their use of the orbit
spectrum. These might reduce the likelihood of conflicts and tensions
between newcomers who seek slots and frequencies which incumbents
already occupy (rather than incur much higher capital and operating costs
without them), and incumbents unwilling to adjust orbital positions or to
undertake costly retrofits and equipment design modifications. The basic
issue is the extent to which incumbents should be forced to accommodate
latecomers regardless of the adjustment costs the incumbents would face.
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In considering how to design ITU arrangements which would help to
avoid such conflicts in the future, the following possible scheme should be
considered:
(1) Every new satellite applicant must not only identify a preferred
orbital location but also two or three alternate points from which
it could be serviced;
(2) Any latecomer (LDC) could request an incumbent (DC) to reposi-
tion its satellite (or to adjust its ground equipment) so that the
latecomer could occupy its preferred position, provided that the
latecomer reimbursed the incumbent for any extra (adjustment)
costs thereby incurred;
(3) Where the incumbent refuses to adjust any ground equipment, or
to move to a previously agreed upon alternate orbital location, it
must reimburse the latecomer for extra costs the latecomer would
incur to reach its proposed service area, were it compelled to oper-
ate at any second-best position. (This reimbursement will be called
"'penalty costs.")
The purpose of such analysis would be to formulate specific rules under
which: 49
(1) An incumbent would have the right to refuse to reposition its
satellite (or to adjust its ground equipment), provided it paid the
above penalty costs, but
(2) If the incumbent did adjust, the latecomer must itself pay those
necessary adjustment costs.
Part of the analysis must also focus on whether:
(1) The incumbent would prefer to stay put and reimburse the late-
comer where the extra value to the incumbent of operating from its
preferred location would exceed the extra costs the latecomer
would incur by being forced to a less preferred location; and
(2) The latecomer would find it worthwhile to seek the change unless
the value to it of operating from a preferred position fell short of
the costs the incumbent would incur in shifting positions, and
which latecomers must pay.
Before proceeding, let us define these cost concepts in greater detail. On
the one hand, adjustment costs are defined as hardware costs only, estimat-
ed arbitrarily at one-half the total change in value when incumbent moves
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from one orbital position to another. This is analogous to a highway
builder who, as a latecomer, will compensate a building owner for his
building but not for the discounted value of future earnings that the road
will eliminate, i.e., for the foregone future income.
This implies, first, that even if building owner owned his building and
land outright, as a property right, under eminent domain the state could
condemn land and evict occupant to accommodate the latecomer (road
builder), but not pay the incumbent full compensation for the loss. In orbit
spectrum, a weak analogy exists, but does not fit tightly since, strictly
speaking, only de facto rights exist, not formal legal rights under internation-
al law. Yet even if slots are a common resource of all mankind, and even
if incumbent has no permanent rights to use them, still, before incumbent's
investment is fully amortized, it must be compensated to move, though
again not for the slot's full value, only for extra equipment costs incurred.
Penalty costs, on the other hand, are most analogous to environmental
pollution costs. If the incumbent will not move on request, it must com-
pensate the latecomer for extra costs (losses) imposed. In environmental
pollution, with pollution charges, if a polluter will not clean up via invest-
ment to control pollution to accommodate latecomer users of atmosphere
or water, it must pay pollution charges instead, for the pollution imposed
on these latecomers. Before latecomers appear as second-best users of
atmosphere, that is, no harm is imposed and the atmosphere is a free good.
But when latecomers do appear, there is no more free good, and incumbent
polluters must either control pollution under law, or pay for the pollution
costs imposed upon the latecomers. Indeed, without pollution charges,
users of air, water, or the amenities, will not be even crudely aware of the
opportunity costs of their use.
Bear in mind, finally, that this whole process entails hypothetical pre-
sentations before a new international arbitral authority. Incumbents and
latecomers must both estimate (a) penalty costs, and (b) adjustment costs,
with assessment by the new arbitral authority-subject to empirical, con-
ceptual, and political imperfections.
How might such principles and analysis operate in practice? Several
years ago, India and Indonesia both sought access to orbital positions for
proposed domestic satellites close to those then occupied by INTELSAT
and the Soviet Union's STATIONAR system. The applicants in each case
did not foresee the likelihood of serious interference with the incumbent
systems, if only the incumbents would adjust their antenna beams and
earth station equipment appropriately. The incumbents refused to adjust,
however. INTELSAT was unwilling to lose its ability to connect London
and Sydney in one hop, and the Russians did not want to relinquish their
one-hop connect between Vladivostok and the Czech border. As a conse-
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quence, India (INSAT) and Indonesia (PALAPA) each had to make costly
design adjustments of their own. 50
India is said to have lost about 20 percent of its initially proposed
satellite capacity. In addition, India's problems led it to advocate detailed
longterm a priori allotments at future space conferences, as at WARC-77.
Indonesia's brusque treatment by the Soviets and the adjustment costs it
faced also encouraged it to pursue a direct planning approach.
Designing ITU arrangements to avoid such conflict in the future would
serve DC interests. Under the guiding principles here proposed, any in-
cumbent would have the right to refuse to reposition its satellite or adjust
its ground equipment, provided it reimbursed the latecomer for the extra
costs it would incur if compelled to operate at its second-best position. If
the incumbent did adjust, on the other hand, the latecomer would pay its
necessary adjustment costs.
It could of course be argued that INTELSAT in the above case represents
107 countries, whereas India is only one, so that the two users are not of
equal importance and, therefore, cannot be treated the same. Superficially,
one might even contend that a hierarchy of users might justify a lower
penalty charge for a global consortium (with 107 co-owners), than for a
single country incumbent which chose not to accommodate a latecomer as
described. 51
Yet such reasoning is seriously flawed. Even multi-firm domestic joint
ventures in the United States, or in foreign trade, must bid in the market
against competing users for non-spectrum resources. Then why should
INTELSAT, or INMARSAT, not also be expected to compete for orbit
spectrum, say, against India, Indonesia, or Chad? In this paper, the incum-
bent's demand price for access to orbit spectrum is crudely reflected in the
penalty costs it agrees to pay to hold its preferred slot. A latecomer's
demand price is also (crudely) reflected in the adjustment costs it would
pay to dislodge an incumbent from an assignment the latecomer wants.
Indeed, earlier we saw demand price more directly reflected in lease pay-
ments by LDCs, or DCs, to secure access to unused assignments in a
comprehensive, long-term, pre-engineered allocation plan.
In all three cases, the payments in question virtually constitute the price
to use orbit spectrum under the hypothesized conditions. There seems no
less reason for INTELSAT, EUTELSAT, ARABSAT, or INMARSAT to pay
for this resource, then, than to compete, as they necessarily do, for ad-
ministrative or engineering personnel in the labor market, or for capital in
the capital market. 52
By way of an illustrative starting point for further analysis, and in no
way any definitive proposal, consider next the hypothetical facts summa-
rized in Tables I and II which follow.
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TABLE 1: Estimation of Hypothetical Charges
Value of A to INTELSAT
Value of B to INTELSAT
Value of A to India
Value of B to India
Penalty Costs on Intelsat
for staying
Adjustment Costs on India
if INTELSAT moves
13-11=2 7-4=3 7-6=1 7-6.5=.5
12- 11.5=
.5/2 =
.25
10-8=
2/2=
1.0
10-8=
2/2=
1.0
10-8=
2/2 =
1.0
In scenario I, INTELSAT will move from slot A to slot B (though value
to it falls from 12 to 11.5), since it thereby avoids (a) penalty costs of 2,
(b) net loss in value of A of 1.5, and receives (c) hardware adjustment costs
TABLE II: Summary of Hypothetical Outcomes
Scenario Value of A
I rises
falls
(but India's
relative gain
exceeds INT's
relative loss)
Latecomer
(India)
pays adjustment
costs & gets A
pays adjustment
costs & gets A
Incumbent Ecomonic
(INTELSAT) Efficiency
moves to B rises
moves to B rises
III stable must take B
(India's relative gets penalty
loss less than costs
what INT's rel-
ative loss
would have been)
IV stable takes B but
(same as in II) gets penalty
costs
keeps A and rises
pays penalty
costs
keeps A and rises
pays penalty
costs
Equity
rises
rises
falls
falls
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of .25 from latecomer, equal to one-half of loss in incumbent's slot value
of 2-1.5 =.5/2 = .25. Hence by moving from A to B, incumbent loses, net,
only .25 in value, whereas if she stays put she loses penalty cost,
13-11 = 2 + foregone adjustment costs of .25, or 2.25. Note also that in this
scenario, value of A rises from 12 (for incumbent) to 13 (for India), with
India risking only .25 in adjustment costs if INTELSAT moves, but in that
case improving its own position from 11 to 13, or by 2. Finally, note that
economic efficiency rises insofar as total value after the reassignments will
be 13 + 11.5 = 24.5, compared to 12 + 11 = 23 beforehand. In addition, equi-
ty increases insofar as latecomer's relative gains (2/11=18%) exceed in-
cumbent's loss (.5/12=4%).
In scenario II, on the other hand, once again INTELSAT would lose only
2 by moving from A to B, but avoid payment of 3 in penalty costs to India,
and receive 1 in adjustment costs, and hence suffer a net loss of only 1. By
the same token, India risks only 1 in adjustment costs by making the
request, but receives 3 in penalty costs if INTELSAT refuses. Here, because
INTELSAT does move from A to B, India does pay 1 in adjustment costs,
but raises its expected slot value from 4 (B) to 7 (A), triple those adjustment
costs.
By the same token, though the value of A falls from 10 to 7 in scenario
II, total value of A plus B rises from 14 to 15, India's relative gain
(% =75%) far exceeds INTELSAT's loss 2/10=20%, or more precisely,
from 10 to 8 plus adjustment costs of 1, or 10-9=1/10=10%). On all
counts then, economic efficiency has increased, and so, too, has the equity
in latecomer gains.
Yet in scenario III, INTELSAT would opt to stay put to avoid loss of 2
which would be twice the penalty costs of 1 she would otherwise incur.
Even with adjustment costs in moving to B added, INTELSAT would
receive only 8 (at B) plus 1 (adjustment costs), or 9, just equal to her net
value in staying put, viz., 10-1 penalty costs, or 9. So why move?
If, as in scenario IV, value of A and B to India were closer still, say, at
7 and 6.5, then there would be even less reason for INTELSAT to move.
Again, in scenario IV as in III, incumbent would in fact pay the opportunity
costs of its incumbency as reflected in penalty costs of 1.
So much for the tables. A further word is in order on penalty costs and
their rationale. These do, indeed, appear to rise over time; as with pollution
costs, recall that what was seemingly a free good at the outset (air, water,
land) becomes congested, polluted, and scarce with growing numbers of
next-best users. In that case, economic efficiency requires that the oppor-
tunity cost of continued occupancy and use by firstcomers be identified
and paid for. This is also true of orbit spectrums.
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As for adjustment costs, on the other hand, recall that these comprise
not the full difference in value between A and B when incumbent moves
to B, but are set arbitrarily at one-half this, viz., at hardware costs net of
future income stream. Granted, however, that with enough increase in
power, incumbent could conceivably restore the original service of A in
slot B. But this might cost a lot, indeed be equal to or greater than the
original loss of moving from A to B. If so, with adjustment costs that big,
why would an incumbent ever stay put and pay opportunity costs?
There are indeed four reasons. First, expanded hardware costs would
have to be at least double the size of the loss for adjustment costs (at
one-half) to leave the incumbent without incentive to move-at best a
very large sum. This alone reduces the likelihood of any such eventuality.
Second, to pay for the hardware move from A to B is one thing. But would
an incumbent in any case be willing to risk being permanently saddled
with these excessive hardware costs by designing a system mainly to keep
latecomers out of A? Third, the governing rule might specify that hardware
adjustment costs must be limited to parameters initially set by the incum-
bent in applying for A and B, and these would necessarily be limited by
potential signal interference effects from A and B. Fourth, and last, if
penalty costs actually went to a third party, say the United Nations or the
ITU (for infrastructure development), there is no incentive for latecomers
to make frivolous claims to exact penalty costs from the incumbent. There-
fore, adjustment costs could be scrapped entirely without running that risk. True,
the latecomer responsibility for the incumbent's adjustment costs symboli-
cally recognizes the incumbent's business equities in a slot. However,
eliminating that responsibility implicitly favors the latecomer's equities
instead.
So much for the proposed modification of existing coordination proce-
dures. Needless to say, there are shortcomings in any such scheme in the
present institutional and real-world setting. There may be intractable dis-
putes over international assessment of relative adjustment and penalty
costs as separately estimated by incumbents and latecomers. Could the
ITU, as presently constituted, readily administer any such mechanism? As
a consensus standards organization, is it the appropriate forum for such
decisions? Or does its longstanding animus against economic incentive
mechanisms to resolve what are still widely viewed as technical or engi-
neering problems, really rule out such a role? If so, could the International
Court of Justice effectively figure in such assessments, or may it in turn be
too cumbersome a mechanism for that purpose? In that case, might a new
international arbitral organ really have to be established, with all the
political, legal and institutional problems this would pose?
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However serious these shortcomings may be, the alternatives to any
such modified coordination procedure are by no means without their own
limitations. Thus, the status quo would at best continue to deprive late-
comers of equitable access, whereas instituting an economically ideal auc-
tion scheme faces far reaching administrative, political, and technical
obstacles well beyond our scope here to review. 53 To improve the econom-
ic efficiency of orbit spectrum allocations, then, some hard decisions must
be made between second-best solutions which are closer to the current
administrative-institutional framework, and economically more ideal
mechanisms even less likely to win international acceptance.
Why not allow a private transaction between LDC and DC rather than
one which entails the administrative and computational complexity of
penalty costs and adjustment costs? A private transaction would work only
where (1) the value of an orbital position to incumbent and newcomer
differ substantially, and where (2) both parties have comparable access to
the capital market. Given the different wealth of DCs and LDCs, and their
different access to capital markets, a bald market contest would clearly
work to the LDC's disadvantage. Imposing penalty costs as conceived here
on incumbent DCs would at least operate to help the less affluent LDCs
(by forcing the incumbent to pay the opportunity costs of its occupancy).
At the same time, as noted earlier, a latecomer, faced with having to pay
for an incumbent's adjustment costs, would thereby be restrained from
making frivolous requests.
Ultimately, we want the preferred position to go to the party for whom
it has the greatest relative value, each party being reimbursed for the extra
cost of being compelled to use its next best alternative. However, the rules
outlined here would at best facilitate only a very crude approximation of
that result. What we really need is a procedure which clearly reveals
demand, such as a grand auction of perpetual rights at the outset, 5 4 some-
thing this article will not examine.
The mechanism outlined above would help equalize the standing of
latecomers and incumbents and hence reduce the former's resentment and
resulting North-South confrontations. Without by any means approaching
a complete market for orbit spectrum, these procedures might usefully
introduce controlled economic incentives into the process of coordination
and planning.
CONCLUSION
The current legal debate concerning the allocation of the orbit spectrum
threatens to reach an impasse because of irreconcilable differences between
the DCs and LDCs. If this should happen, the allocation of this scarce
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common resource might degenerate into unregulated national behavior, as
each state pursues its own interests. This will have grave consequences for
the quality of the orbit spectrum as a natural resource; inevitably conges-
tion, misuse and economic inefficiency will result.
This article proposes that market incentives be allowed to operate in the
allocation of the orbit spectrum. These incentives may be introduced by
means of leasing arrangements for unused assignments (with payment in
kind, by stock ownership, cash or by bonds), or by means of an accommo-
dation procedure. Under the latter, DCs using vacant LDC slots would post
large bonds to guarantee that they (the DCs) will vacate when LDCs are
ready to enter, or else forfeit such bonds as lump-sum payments of rents
equal to the minimum any LDC will require to release its assignment, viz.,
the cost of its next best terrestrial alternative. The last alternative proposed
was a modified coordination procedure which requires incumbents to pay
third parties the opportunity costs of continued occupancy when latecom-
ers seek entry, under rules which operate to equalize the standing of both
parties in gaining access to scarce orbit spectrum resources.
Although such procedures and lease market mechanisms are at best
imperfect arrangements for efficient orbit spectrum allocations, important
advantages may still accrue. Not only will a more optimal use of the
common resource result, but the tension between technological demand
and equitable access can be mitigated.
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States could not create exclusive rights for themselves, they do not have the power
to give exclusive rights to international organizations, which, as agents of States would
give to States by way of an international edict some or all of the rights prohibited by
the terms of Article 2.
The same language in Article 2 is also alleged "[fin practical terms... to deprive the ITU
or WARCs of the power to grant sovereign and exclusive rights to the orbit/spectrum
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resource by way of making allotments...." Legal Implications, FCC Space WARC Advisory
Comm., FCC Doc. No. B1-15 (1982) (statement of Carl Christol).
Nevertheless, numerous precedents in domestic U.S. regulatory law allow regulatory
authority to delineate spectrum rights and hold them open for future use by latecomers
unable presently to use them. Other laws and regulations deliberately override or qualify the
rule of capture, to safeguard educational, social or other non-market goals. See Levin, Foreign
and Domestic U.S. Policies-Spectrum Reservations and Media Balance, 6 TELECOM. POL'Y 123 (1982); see
also Legal Implications, FCC Space WARC Advisory Comm., FCC Doc. No. B1-21 (1982)
(statement of Donna Demac).
14 OTA REPORT, supra note 3, at 126, 132-33. Curiously, there is virtually no discussion
of such mechanisms in the otherwise far-ranging OTA REPORT-none in the six policy options
it outlines, id. at 114-26, and only one vague reference to "economic techniques" in its final
findings, observations and conclusions. Id. at 135
Nevertheless, the OTA Report underscores the necessity of reaching a compromise in
spectrum allocation. Not only does U.S. influence in the International Telecommunication
Union (ITU) appear to have declined over time, while that of the Third World has increased,
id. at 53-54, but finding a "practical compromise" is widely recognized as both "possible and
desirable." Id. at 72.
For a discussion of the origins of a priori planning as the Third World response to the ITU's
traditional evolutionary approach, see Christol, Telecommunications, Outer Space and the New Interna-
tional Information Order (N11O), 8 SYRAcusE J. lNr'L L. oF CoM. 343, 354-59 (1981); see also Christol,
National Claims for the Using/Sharing of the Orbit/Spectrum Resource, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-
FOURTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 116 (1982) (review and appraisal of both
approaches) [hereinafter cited as National Claims ].
15 The next task of this article will be to explore the theory behind, and basic benefits
of, a market allocation system. For methodological purposes, it will assume that the basic
problem is confined to one state's allocation of orbital slots among competing domestic users.
But most of the observations and conclusions are applicable in the international arena.
16 Either from a first-come, first-served system (e.g., early American settlers who simply
fenced in what they wanted), or through a political decision (all citizens who meet certain
prerequisites get the resource, along the lines of the U.S. Homestead Act).
17 Placing a satellite in orbit is a costly proposition. However, many satellites are designed
for multiple uses. This seems implicit in the emerging market for transponders. (A "transpon-
der" is the device on a communications satellite which amplifies and relays transmissions
between "transmit" and "receive" earth stations.)
In the domestic U.S. setting, the FCC is trying to regulate this burgeoning market for
multi-use satellite services. See, e.g., FCC Vetoes Transponder Auction, BROADCASTING, Feb. 1, 1982,
at 31. But the policy was liberalized in a more recent FCC Memorandum Opinion. See In re
Domestic Fixed-Satellite Transponder Sales, Docket No. 82-45 (F.C.C. Aug. 17, 1982).
18 See H. LEvIN, THE INVISIBLE RESOURCE 149-50 (1971) [hereinafter cited as INVISIBLE
RESOURCE].
19 E.g., in the case of real estate, in addition to the nuisance cause of action, restrictive
covenants and zoning laws serve this function. See 0. BROWDER, R. CUNNINGHAM, J. JULIN & A.
SMITH, BASIC PROPERTY LAW 111-33, 612-706, 1104-1436 (3d ed. 1979).
20 See Levin, Spectrum Allocation Without Market, Am. ECON. REv., May 1970, at 209, 210-11.
21 See INVISmLE RESOURCE, supra note 18, at 85-91.
22 See Levin, supra note 20, at 213-18.
23 E.g., the Multipoint Distribution Service (MDS), a common carrier service in the
microwave band geared to broadcast the same material to different fixed receivers.
2 4 See INvIsIBLE RESOURCE, supra note 18, at 118 ("The maximum sums that users of spectrum
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would be willing to pay rather than do without some marginal amount of bandwidth
25 One must distinguish between the consequences of being deprived of all one's spec-
trum, and being deprived of some smaller amount. The problem of finding substitutes for an
entire block of spectrum to, e.g., a mobile service, is one thing; substitution at the margin of
one use is something quite different. Small decrements or increments of spectrum impose
different constraints on systems choices and hardware design. This is as true for communica-
tions satellite systems and for the aeronautical-maritime or land mobile services as it is for
point-to-point microwave.
The central issue here is whether to allot a little more, or a little less, spectrum to any group
of users. What are the implications of marginal adjustments in spectrum availability on
systems design, systems choices, and hardware costs? Holding constant the desired degree
of reliability, what are the dollar trade-offs in building any system, between varying the
amounts of spectrum and such nonspectrum factors as vehicles, personnel, storage, and a
variety of electronic components?
26 Lease market transaction costs working through its home government and the ITU,
however, might still be greater than if a transnational corporation deals directly with a foreign
administration. The latter bypasses bureaucratic delays and skirts the ITU's hostility to rental
or lease payments.
27 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
28 An international scheme might also apply to orbit and spectrum assignments the
principle of stratified bidding which is used in the allocation of highway concessionaire
rights, timber sales, grazing rights and offshore oil rights. The best example of "stratified
bidding" is that of "set asides" in timber sales, where some auctions are limited to small
businesses.
29 See Statement by Harvey Levin, U.S. Orbit Spectrum Strategies-Is There a Role for
Satellite Hardware Companies?, Conference of the International Association of Satellite
Users 4-8 (Apr. 1981).
30 For a discussion of orbit spectrum assignments which differs from this article, see
Jackson, The Orbit Spectrum Resource: Market Allocation of International Property, 2 TELECOM. PoL'Y 179,
179-90 (1978); see also Agnew, Gould, Dunn, & Stibolt, EcoNoMic TecmIQUeS FOR SPECTRUM
MANAGEMENT chs. 12, 13 (1979). See generally General Electric Co., Electromagnetic Spectrum Manage-
ment: Alternatives and Experiments at §§ 4 (lease/sale market system) and 7 (spectrum leasing), in
STAFF PAPER No. 7 OF THE PReSIDENT's TASK FoRcE ON CoMuaMcrIAoNs Poucv at app. A (1969).
31 Even Third World spokespersons recognize the dangers of "padded" claims on spec-
trum under a priori assignment plans, at least without "a method to guarantee without unfair
penalty access to the resource." Srirangan, supra note 3, at para. 14.4.1. He goes on to note
that "[o]nce this lacuna is removed, the tendency to exaggerate needs would be moderated."
32 Proposals by equatorial nations (among the poorest on many counts) to charge rent for
DC access to their unique resource, the equatorial orbit spectrum needed for geosynchronous
satellites, have generated discussions related in some ways to the leasing ideas contained in
this article. These proposals would distribute the rents generated: first, to equatorial nations
themselves; second, to the LDCs more generally; and third, to developed countries at large.
See Christol, International Space Law and the Use of Space Resources: Solar Energy, 15 REvuE BELGE DE
Daorr INT'L 38 (1980); Christol, The Geostationary Orbital Position as a Natural Resource of the Space
Environment, 26 NeTl. INT'L L. Rsv. 5, 15-22 (1979); see also Pool, The Problems of WARC, J. Comm.,
Winter 1979, at 187, 189 (related discussion pertaining to the possible imposition of an excise
tax on international activities such as transportation, communications and commerce; or a tax
on the use of orbital slots of frequency spectrum); Robinson, Regulation of International Airwaves:
The 1979 WARC, 21 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 43, 47-52 (1980) (discussing technical and development
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assistance with-as a distribution of wealth issue-LDCs selling or subleasing their usage or
access rights to more affluent countries; also discussing allocation by market).
33 See Levin, Orbit and Spectrum Resource Strategies - Third World Demands, 5 TELECOM. POL'Y 102,
105-06 (1981).
34 The difficulty of this task is widely recognized. See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 32, at
43-44, 47-52.
35 Orbital arc here refers to the curved path described by a satellite around the earth.
36 For a recent discussion of the related concept of "super-service" areas (SSA), in which
neighboring nations retain disretion to "defer their choice of channel bandwidth and channel
spacing until ... ready to design [their] systems," see Gould, Hupe & Reinhart, Domestic
Broadcast Satellite System: The Need for a Common Standard and the Case for Block Allotment Planning, in
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON COMMUNICATIONS sec. 4 (1982). Block frequency allotment plan-
ning has considerable flexibility in polarization, antenna sidelobe control, bandwidth reduc-
tion, and other attributes of system design, all "without seeking the agreement of countries
that lie in other super service areas." Id. The key mechanism is the agreements several nations
strike within any given SSA on each other's technical requirements. See Panel of Experts
Preparing for the 1983 Regional Administrative Radio Conference, Block Allocation Plan-
ning, Ad Hoc 177-133 (Rev.) (Nov. 18, 1981).
37 Although a lease market approach is normally ignored in current Third World com-
mentary, it does seem to provide "a method of negotiation and coordination" to enable
"assigned slot[s] .. .unused for any reason and [which] can usefully meet someone else's
needs ... [to be so used.]" Srirangan, supra note 3, at para. 14.4.2. Lease markets and orbit
spectrum pricing also appear to be responsive to Resolution BP of WARC-79, see ITU, FINAL
ACTS OF THE WORLD ADMNISTRATIVE RADIO CONFERENCE (1979), and to article 33 of the Interna-
tional Telecommunications Convention, supra note 8. The resolution considers the orbit/
spectrum as "limited natural resources, suitable for allocation by relative pricing." See Nation-
al Claims, supra note 14, at 3-4. Article 33 prescribes that the orbit/spectrum resource "must
be used efficiently and economically so that countries... may have equitable access to both
... according to their needs and the technical facilities at their disposal." Id. Again, lease
markets and orbit/spectrum pricing appear suitable implementing mechanisms.
38 Must the benefits foregone due to some of the orbital arc being unused (under a
loosely-packed plan) impose net economic losses? Not necessarily, if the greater transferabili-
ty of rights arising from the loosely-packed plan generates sufficient extra economic outputs
from the higher valued uses to which the assignments are moved. The vigor of the American
urban real estate market, where a 5-10 percent vacancy rate is considered optimal, suggests
that technical underutilization may actually result in net economic gains.
39 See De Vany, Eckert, Meyers, O'Hara & Scott, A Property System for Market Allocation of the
Electromagnetic Spectrum: A Legal-Economic-Engineering Study, 21 STAN. L. REv. 1499, 1505-18 (1969).
40 Recall the hold-out problem discussion, supra text after note 21.
41 Recall the user maximization discussion, supra text accompanying note 21.
42 The bond method thus addresses the issue of access, timely surrender and guarantees.
These problems will be discussed in the next section from two perspectives.
43 See Second United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space [Second UNISPACE Conference], Declaration of the Group of 77, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.101/5/PC/L.22 (1982).
44 See, e.g., ACADEMY FOR EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, WARC-79: DEVELOPMENT COMMUNICA-
TIONS STRATEGY-A REPORT TO USAID 29-31 (1979). The guarantor concept continues to
generate interest. See CCIR, Provisional Technical Report for WARC 84, Doc. No. 4/286-E,
at 100-02 (1981) (section on equitable access); see also Levin, supra note 33, at 105.
45 Actuarial risk that an HDC will not vacate on time really depends on two factors: the
rate of obsolescence (the wearing out of satellite equipment), and the probability of renewal
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in a market that has been attractively developed. On the former, if the satellite equipment
does wear out within the agreed period, e.g., 10 years, then it is more likely that the DC will
withdraw on schedule, and hence "redeem" the bond. But if the equipment does not wear
out that rapidly, DCs are less likely to vacate on time, and the actuarial risk of bond forfeiture
and consequent premium to third party insurers will be much higher. Second, timely with-
drawal is also less likely if the incumbent opts to replace equipment, even if it wears out
during the term of the lease. The incumbent would have some incentive to remain in the
orbital position because its markets would develop over time.
However, new technology could induce it to alter its orbit slot utilization.
46 Depending on the contracting states' agreement, the promises would be enforceable
before the International Court of Justice. The parties could also agree to arbitrate.
Even if the DC were in fact a private company, there is some authority that it could invoke
principles of international law before an arbitral panel to enforce its contract, provided the
contract was "internationalized." See Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co./California Asiatic Oil
Co. v. Libyan Arab Republic, 17 I.L.M. 1 (1978).
47 E.g., Let a satellite service cost $50 million and a next-best terrestrial alternative $250
million for either an LDC or a DC. (The cost of the land alternative is likely to differ between
DC and LDC, but we assume comparability here for convenience.) The DC would save $200
million if it could borrow an LDC's unused assignment and install a satellite. The LDC would
redeem the $250 million bond if the DC refused to vacate on time (less the $50 million it
would have paid for satellite service). It would net $200 million.
Hence, the bond posting constitutes a guarantee that the DC will vacate on schedule or
pay for the extra cost-of an LDC's next-best alternative. It also represents a guarantee to the
DC that it may use an unused LDC assignment for a specified period, at a cost of covering
the actuarial risk that it will fail to vacate on time. For both parties, in this scenario at least,
the value of the "lease" is $200 million.
48 Another approach, avoiding the risks for the LDC described above, would be for the
DC to offer to install the satellite gratis (for 10-15 years) in exchange for a rent-free lease
for, say, five years, but on the explicit understanding that the satellite would revert to the
LDC afterward. Here, the longer the satellite lifetime, the more things the LDC could do with
it when the DC's rent-free period is over.
For an excellent early statement documenting still other DC-LDC joint arrangements in
space, see Christol, Space Joint Ventures: The United States and Developing Nations, 8 AKRON L. REV.
398 (1975). Professor Christol reviews the history of such bilateral space environment joint
ventures, which include arrangements with Argentina, Bolivia, Columbia, The Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, India, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and
Venezuela.
49 For a similar formulation, see INVIsIBL RESOURCE, supra note 17, at 228-30 app. D; Levin,
New Technology and the Old Regulation in Radio Spectrum Management, AMERICAN ECONOMIC REv., May
1966, 346-49.
50 The episode described in this paragraph and the next appears to illustrate very nicely
the kind of latecomer handicap increasingly attributed to present coordination procedures.
See Srirangan, supra note 3, at paras. 13.1, 13.2.
S More specifically, one might ask: "Why should Chad, Zimbabwe, Libya, or Paraguay
and Uruguay, as INTELSAT members with limited resources, and no Indian Ocean service
be expected to help reimburse India for the extra costs allegedly imposed on it by INTEL-
SAT's refusal to move?" The simple answer is that all INTELSAT members in this scenario-
including Chad, Zimbabwe, etc.-receive 14% on their investment shares, and hence benefit
at least indirectly from INTELSAT's Indian Ocean service. Therefore, the fact that they
themselves have no Indian Ocean service is irrelevant. To raise the question at all in the above
form reveals a basic misunderstanding of the economics of orbit spectrum management in
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particular, and of multi-party consortia in general. Furthermore, though procedures now exist
for a technical resolution of potential interference problems before any satellite is placed, this
by no means precludes the imposition of cost disadvantages on latecomer nations-India in
our hypothetical example-or on firstcomer incumbents (INTELSAT). Quite the contrary: the
very technical resolutions undertaken could well raise the cost of satellite design (for LDC
or DC), or of comparable geographic coverage, above those design costs if such potential
interference had not arisen.
52 Nor is there any reason why mere existence of numerous separate consortium members
need preclude the assessment of penalties on, and payments by, the INTELSAT organization.
After all, signatories exercise voting rights and share in INTELSAT revenues according to
their respective investment shares-and do so whatever the source of INTELSAT revenues.
One equitable formula might therefore be to distribute penalty costs among signatories
according to those investment shares. This would have the dual advantage of making all
signatories (a) more aware of, and sensitive to, the external cost ramifications of INTELSAT
behavior (on proposed domestic or regional systems of particular members); and (b) more
involved in creating or joining internal voting coalitions on decisions which not only bear
directly on voting members, but also more generally on total INTELSAT revenues.
53 See INVISIBLE RESOURCE, supra note 18, at 147-57; Robinson, supra note 32, at 47-52.
54 My colleague, Professor William S. Vickrey of Columbia University, has described such
an auction scheme to me as follows. "[The spectrum would be allocated] on the basis of a
demand-revealing procedure. Every interested party would be asked to state in a set of bids
the value it places on various possible combinations of spectrum pieces it might be interested
in. An allocation is determined to maximize the aggregate value. A set of alternate allocations
is also determined, by optimizing with each party in turn excluded; and each party charges
an amount equal to the difference between the value of the allocations received in the
corresponding alternate allocation and the (smaller) value of the allocations to the n-1 parties
in the actual allocation. The proceeds can be used to help finance the U.N.; or alternatively
the process can be carried out separately for the eastern and western hemispheres, with the
payments for western slots distributed to countries in the east and vice versa, on some
suitable basis that will give the LDCs an adequately large share."
